Regulating for sustainable electricity market outcomes in Britain : asking the law question by McHarg, Aileen
McHarg, Aileen (2013) Regulating for sustainable electricity market 
outcomes in Britain : asking the law question. Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal, 30 (4). pp. 289-302. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/44348/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
REGULATING FOR SUSTAINABLE ELECTRICITY MARKET OUTCOMES IN BRITAIN: ASKING THE LAW 
QUESTION 
Aileen McHarg* 
Introduction 
A sustainable approach to electricity regulation may be taken to mean  one which seeks to integrate 
social, environmental and economic objectives, and which encompasses the interests of future as 
well as current generations.1  More specifically, according to the British energy regulator, Ofgem,2 as 
ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶŐ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?it involves: managing the transition to a low 
carbon economy; eradicating fuel poverty and protecting vulnerable consumers; promoting energy 
saving; ensuring a secure and reliable electricity supply; and supporting improvement in all aspects 
of the environment.3  This new regulatory paradigm contrasts with the market paradigm which 
dominated electricity regulation in many countries, including Britain and Australia, for much of the 
past two decades, and which focused on the pursuit of economic efficiency through competition or 
competition-substitutes.  Nevertheless, while a sustainable approach rejects the claim that markets 
can supply all the answers to regulatory problems, and implies a more active role for government in 
shaping industry outcomes,4 the market remains  W at least for the time being  W the context in which 
broader policy goals must be pursued.  In turn, current market and regulatory structures betray the 
legacy of the post-ǁĂƌ ‘ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŵŽĚĞů ?, which was primarily concerned with securing economies of 
scale, and expanding electricity networks and generating capacity to meet rising demand, through 
vertical integration and monopolisation, centralised networks and large-scale, often highly polluting, 
generating units. 
Against this historical background, making the transition to sustainable electricity markets is likely to 
require fundamental and wide-ranging reforms.  Although the shape of such markets is contested, 
and the precise changes needed will depend upon the context, they are likely to include some or all 
of the following:5: 
x Improved financial and other support for low carbon generation; 
x More stringent control of greenhouse gas and other harmful emissions; 
x Changes to market rules and structures, for example, in wholesale markets to facilitate 
access by, and prioritise despatch of, low carbon generation or to reward excess capacity 
and demand-side reductions, or in retail markets to promote new business models focused 
on the supply of energy services rather than units of energy; 
x Changes to network price controls, charging, access and operational rules, to facilitate 
investment in grid extensions and reinforcements and smart metering technology, to 
                                                          
* Professor of Public Law, University of Strathclyde, Scotland. 
1 See, eg, World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), Our Common 
Future (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987) p 8; OECD, Governance for Sustainable Development: Five OECD 
Case Studies (OECD, 2002) p 10. 
2 The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets.  
3 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Pages/Sustain.aspx viewed 3 April 2013. 
4 See Mitchell C, The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008) ch 9. 
5 See, eg, Patterson W, Keeping the Lights One: Towards Sustainable Electricity (Earthscan, London, 2007) Pt 2; 
Mitchell, n 4, pp 62-66. 
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remove barriers to renewables, distributed generation, combined heat and power, and 
micro-generation, and to cope with intermittency and two-way power flows; 
x Increased interconnection between systems (where possible) to improve reliability and 
security of supply and reduce system costs; 
x Measures to promote innovation, for example, in the development of low carbon generation 
technologies, smart grids, or electricity storage; 
x Stronger measures to promote energy efficiency and conservation; 
x New social programmes to protect vulnerable consumers against rising energy costs; 
x Planning and associated reforms to reduce obstacles to investment in new infrastructure, 
whilst minimising adverse environmental impacts; 
x Greater co-ordination between electricity and other energy markets, particularly transport 
and heat. 
The scale of the regulatory challenge that this transition involves should not be underestimated.6  
For one thing, it requires massive investment in new generating capacity, network assets and 
demand-side measures.  Not only has this need arisen in an era of financial crisis, but problems of 
capital intensity, sunk costs and long asset lives make investment in electricity assets inherently 
risky, hence requiring a high degree of financial and regulatory certainty.  Combined with its network 
character, these factors also make the electricity industry particularly prone to problems of path 
ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂů  ‘ůŽĐŬ-ŝŶ ? ?  Consequently, to set it on a new, more sustainable path 
urgent and concerted regulatory action is needed.  However, there is a high degree of uncertainty 
about what precisely that path should be.7  This is partly a question of the long timescales involved, 
and hence the difficulty of forecasting technological developments and behavioural changes, but it is 
also a feature of the concept of sustainability itself, which inevitably involves complex  W and value-
laden  W trade-offs between its different elements, and is inherently dynamic.8  In other words, it is 
not clear what industry model offers the optimum balance between economic, social and 
environmental goals; this is, moreover, inherently contestable and liable to change over time.   
Further problems may include: hostile regulatory cultures, particularly within economic regulatory 
agencies still wedded to the market paradigm; the dispersal of legal and other regulatory or 
implementation capacities amongst a range of different agencies and actors;9 and what Kuzemko 
describes ĂƐ  ‘ĚĞƐŬŝůůŝŶŐ ?  W that is, the loss of energy policy expertise within government due to 
                                                          
6 See generally Mitchell, n 4, ch 3; DŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚtŽŽĚŵĂŶ ? ‘ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞŶĞƌŐǇ^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?ŝŶ
Baldwin R, Cave M and Lodge M (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010). 
7 Eg, in 2008, Ofgem identified 5 distinct, but equally plausible development paths for the British electricity 
industry  W Long Term Electricity Networks Scenarios (LENS)  ? Final Report, 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=5&refer=Networks/Trans/Archive/ElecTrans/L
ENS visited 27 April 2013. 
8 See Brundtland Commission, n 1, p 9.  On strong and weak interpretations of sustainability, see eg Neumayer 
E, Weak Versus Strong Sustainability: Exploring the Limits of Two Opposing Paradigms (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2nd revised edn, 2004). 
9 Which may include regulated companies as well as government bodies  W see, eg, Black J,  ‘ĞĐĞŶƚƌŝŶŐ
Regulation: the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a Post-Regulatory World ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Current Legal 
Problems 103.  My focus in this article is, however, on formal regulatory capacity. 
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deliberate strategies of depoliticisation following privatisation and liberalisation.10  Finally, there may 
be significant political opposition to sustainable energy strategies, particularly decarbonisation 
policies, since their benefits are mostly long-term, but their costs to consumers and citizens in terms 
of rising prices and the amenity impacts of new infrastructure will be felt in the short-term.   
In short, making the transition to sustainable electricity markets requires a high degree of regulatory 
commitment to secure the necessary investment in change, but such regulatory commitment is 
difficult to achieve.  In light of these problems, this article discusses the role  W and the limits  W of law 
in supporting the transition to the new regulatory paradigm.  In so doing, I draw upon experience in 
British11 ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ŽŶĐĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚĞƌ ĐŚŝůĚ ŽĨ ŐůŽďĂů
ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?12  Although the regulatory regime never focused exclusively on efficiency  W and 
energy policy goals were explicitly broadened beyond promotion of competition to include social, 
environmental and security of supply goals in 200313  W electricity liberalisation was nevertheless 
pursued further and faster than in most other countries, and the industry regulator was strongly 
committed to the market paradigm.  As recently as 2007, the Sustainable Development Commission 
ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚKĨŐĞŵ ?ƐĐƵůƚƵƌĞǁĂƐƐƚŝůůŚŝŐŚůǇĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚŝĐ ?14 social and environmental measures were 
regarded as market distortions to be kept to a minimum and their core objectives were not 
embedded into its mainstream thinking.  More generally, government policies to promote non-
market objectives were piecemeal, weak and of limited effectiveness.15 
Since around 2008 to 2009, however, there has been a step change in British electricity regulation.16  
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶǁŽƌŬďĞƚƚĞƌŝƐƐƚŝůůĂŵĂũŽƌƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĚƵƚǇƚŽ
promote competition has been weakened,17 and the government now describes its energy policy 
ŐŽĂůƐ ĂƐ ƚŚƌĞĞĨŽůĚ P  ‘ƚŽ ŬĞĞƉ ƚŚĞ ůŝŐŚƚƐ ŽŶ ? ƚŽ ŬĞĞƉ ĞŶĞƌŐǇ ďŝůůƐ ĂĨĨŽƌĚĂďůĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ĚĞĐĂƌďŽŶŝƐĞ
ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?18  Reflecting these altered priorities, there has been a raft of regulatory, 
legislative and other policy changes aimed at promoting sustainable market outcomes, with further 
                                                          
10 Kuzemko C, UK Energy Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Unravelling the Ties that Bind, PhD Thesis, 
University of Warwick, October 2011, pp 218, 233-234, http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/48684/ viewed 3 April 
2013. 
11 I use Britain, rather than the United Kingdom deliberately, since the electricity industry in Northern Ireland is 
organised and regulated separately from the industry in England, Wales and Scotland. 
12 The Economist ? ? ? ? ? ?ƋƵŽƚĞĚďǇzĂƌƌŽǁ: ? ‘tŚĞƌĞEĞǆƚĨŽƌhƚŝůŝƚǇZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?ĞĞƐůĞǇLecture 2010, p 2, 
available at http://www.rpieurope.org/Beesley/2010/Lecture%201%20George%20Yarrow.pdf viewed 4 April 
2013.  
13 Department of Trade and Industry, Our Energy Future  ? Creating a Low Carbon Economy, Cm 5761, (TSO, 
London, 2003). 
14 Sustainable Development Commission, Lost in Transmission? The Role of Ofgem in a Changing Climate 
(2007), pp 11, 25, 31, 36, http://www.sd-
commission.org.uk/data/files/publications/SDC_ofgem_report%20(2).pdf viewed 1 March 2013.  See also 
Bartle I and Vass P, Economic Regulators and Sustainable Development: Promoting Good Governance, CRI 
Research Report 18 (CRI, Bath, 2006). 
15 ^ĞĞDĐ,ĂƌŐ ? ‘dŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶŽŵǇŽĨZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ PĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƌŝƚŝƐŚŶĞƌŐǇZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶhŶĚĞƌ
>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ŝŶĂƌƚŽŶĞƚĂů ?ĞĚƐ ? ?Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006), pp 157-164; Sustainable Development Commission, n 14; Bartle and Vass, n 14; Mitchell, n 4, chs 5 and 
6. 
16 ^ĞĞZƵƚůĞĚŐĞ/ ? ‘h<ŶĞƌŐǇWŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚDĂƌŬĞƚ&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐŵ P,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůKǀĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? ?ŝŶZƵƚůĞĚŐĞ/ĂŶĚ
Wright P, UK Energy Policy and the End of Market Fundamentalism (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
17 Energy Act 2010, s 17(3). 
18 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Electricity Market Reform: Policy Overview, CM 8498 
(London, TSO, 2012) p 7. 
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significant reforms still to come.  Major changes include, inter alia: a fundamental overhaul of 
network price regulation to promote sustainable investment and innovation; new microgeneration 
feed-in tariffs; measures to promote carbon capture and storage; new statutory social tariffs; 
innovative measures to promote energy efficiency; planning reforms to facilitate major 
infrastructure projects; the introduction of a carbon price floor; and a planned roll-out of smart 
meters.  Legislation currently before Parliament will also reform the wholesale electricity market to 
introduce new financial supports for low carbon generators, create a new capacity market, and set 
emissions performance standards for fossil fuel generators.19 
Matters are, however, far from perfect.  There are serious problems with investment in new 
generation capacity, and warnings of an imminent security of supply crisis as older plants come 
offline,20 while energy prices and fuel poverty levels are rising.  Moreover, the planned electricity 
market reforms have been criticised as being too slow and insufficiently radical, and there are mixed 
messages from the current government over its commitment to decarbonisation of the electricity 
system.21 
Sustainable electricity regulation in Britain cannot therefore be regarded as an exemplar, but it 
nevertheless remains interesting as a case study in regulatory change.  As such, it is particularly 
relevant for a ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇůŝŬĞƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐůĞĂĚŝŶůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŝŶŐŝƚƐĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ
ĂŶĚ ĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ůŝŐŚƚ-ŚĂŶĚĞĚ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?22 but which now faces similar pressures to 
address wider objectives, especially in relation to climate change.  Accordingly, my intention is not to 
critique the specific measures that have been undertaken in Britain in pursuit of sustainability 
objectives.23  Rather, my focus is on the meta-regulatory role of law: that is, its role in reorienting the 
regulatory regime towards sustainability.24  I adopt this approach for two main reasons.  First, given 
that the transition to a sustainable electricity market is likely to involve multiple and repeated 
regulatory interventions and adjustments over a prolonged period,25 the general objectives of the 
                                                          
19 For an overview of recent and planned reforms see DECC, Planning Our Electric Future: A White Paper for 
Secure, Affordable and Low-Carbon Electricity Cm 8099 (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48129/2176-emr-white-
paper.pdf viewed 27 April 2013. 
20 See Buchanan A ? ‘tŝůů' ?Ɛ>ŝŐŚƚƐ^ƚĂǇKŶĂŶĚtŝůůƚŚĞ'ĂƐ<ĞĞƉ&ůŽǁŝŶŐ ?>ŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞEĞǆƚĞĐĂĚĞ ? ? ? ?
February 2013, http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Media/keyspeeches/Documents1/LECTURE%20-
%2019TH%20FEBRUARY%202013.pdf viewed 4 April 2013. 
21 See generally House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, Electricity Market Reform, 4th 
Report, 2010  W 2012, HC 742; Draft Energy Bill: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny, 1st Report 2012 -2013, HC 275. 
22 Littlechild S, The Regulation of ƌŝƚŝƐŚdĞůĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐWƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ (Department of Industry, London, 
1983); Economic Regulation of Privatised Water Authorities (HMSO, London, 1986). 
23 For criticisms, see references in n 21; and for a general overview of relevant regulatory instruments, see 
'ƵŶŶŝŶŐŚĂŵE ? ‘RĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ/ŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞŶĞƌŐǇ ? ?ŝŶ'ŽůĚƚŚĂƵ ?The Handbook of 
Global Energy Policy (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 2013). 
24  ‘DĞƚĂ-ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƵƐĞĚŶĂƌƌŽǁůǇƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƉƵďůŝĐŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚŽĨƐĞůĨ-regulatory regimes  W see 
ŽŐůŝĂŶĞƐĞĂŶĚDĞŶĚĞůƐŽŶ ? ‘DĞƚĂ-Regulation and Self-ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŝŶĂůĚǁŝŶ ?ĂǀĞĂŶĚ>ŽĚŐĞ ?ĞĚƐ ?Ŷ6.  
But for its use to refer to the disciplining of public regulatory regimes, see eg Morgan B, Social Citizenship in 
the Shadow of Competition: the Bureaucratic Politics of Regulatory Justification (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003).  
dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐďƌŽĂĚĞƌƐĞŶƐĞŝƐƵƐƵĂůůǇĂƐƐociated with the enforcement of a 
light-touch regulatory model which seeks to minimise interference with the market, but it clearly need not be 
so limited  W see Prosser T, The Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation and Legitimacy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) ch 10. 
25 Cf. Bartle and Vass, n 14, p 16. 
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regulatory regime are at least as important as any specific regulatory instruments.26  Indeed, for this 
reason, promoting good governance is regarded as a key element of sustainable development.27  
Secondly, it is at this meta-regulatory level that the law can make the greatest independent 
contribution to the achievement of sustainability.  Whereas law plays a largely instrumental role in 
supporting specific regulatory interventions, giving legal expression to sustainability objectives by 
creating new institutions or general rights, powers and obligations may itself be regarded an 
important regulatory strategy. 
The role of law should, of course, not be exaggerated.  A decision to change the law requires a prior 
political commitment to sustainability which may be regarded as the key step, liable to produce a 
regulatory response irrespective of what the law says.  Nevertheless, law potentially has three 
important functions to perform: first, reinforcing and maintaining political commitment; second, 
providing a means of co-ordinating dispersed regulatory capacities; and third, balancing competing 
requirements of regulatory certainty and flexibility.  The article considers five legal techniques 
which, although not exhaustive of the ways in which law can promote regulatory change,28 have 
been used to support the transition to sustainable electricity regulation in Britain.  These are: the 
creation of new regulatory institutions; the imposition of new statutory duties; the creation of 
legally-binding targets; obligations to produce guidance, strategies and plans; and legal protections 
against regulatory change.   
Institutional Design 
Given the need to change regulatory culture and to integrate (both vertically and horizontally)29 
economic, social and environmental policies, an obvious means of reorienting regulatory regimes 
towards sustainable outcomes is to establish new institutions with new personnel and procedures, 
and wide-ranging responsibility for sectoral regulation.  In fact, though, despite occasional calls to 
replace Ofgem with a broader energy agency,30 there has been substantial institutional continuity in 
British electricity regulation, with no fundamental reform of the industry regulator since gas and 
electricity regulation were merged, and individual regulators replaced with a regulatory board, by 
                                                          
26 ^ĞĞ&ŝŽƌŝŶŽ: ? ‘ZĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ PWĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŽŶ>ĂǁĂŶĚ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Harvard Environmental Law Review 441. 
27 See, eg, Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, The UK Government Sustainable 
Development Strategy, Cm 6467 (TSO, London, 2005) p 16. 
28 Other techniques might include co-opting the courts as regulators, relying on general legal norms to impose 
sustainability obligations on regulated companies or individuals.  This kind of litigation strategy was, however, 
effectively precluded in situations where a specific regulatory regime already exists by Marcic v Thames Water 
Utilities Ltd [2003] All ER 89.  Alternatively, participatory techniques may be employed as a means of coping 
with uncertainty and enhancing public acceptability of sustainability measures.  Again, with the limited 
ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƉƌŝĐĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ?ƐĞĞDĐ,ĂƌŐ ? ‘ǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶBritish Energy 
Network Regulation: From RPI-X to RIIO ? ?ŝŶZŽŐŐĞŶŬĂŵƉDDĞƚĂů ?ĞĚƐ ? ?Energy Networks and the Law: 
Innovative Solutions in Changing Markets (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) pp 327-328, 330-332), this 
has not been a feature of the British experience.  Indeed, in the context of land-use planning, participation 
rights have arguably been undermined  W see nn 83-86 below and accompanying text. 
29 Bartle and Vass, n 14, pp 13-14. 
30 See in particular Helm D, The New Regulatory Agenda (Social Market Foundation, 2004), 
http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/sites/default/files/TheNewRegulatoryAgenda.pdf viewed 4 April 2013.  See also 
Owen G, Energy Regulation and Sustainability Policy (Sustainability First, 2004) p 30, 
http://www.sustainabilityfirst.org.uk/docs/2004/Econregfinalpdf.pdf viewed 4 April 2013. 
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the Utilities Act 2000.  KĨŐĞŵ ?ƐƐĞŶŝŽƌƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚsince 2003,31 and sustainable 
development is only one of several areas of expertise represented on its governing board.  Similarly, 
the only relevant procedural change has been the imposition of a duty to carry out environmental 
impact assessments.32  
There are several reasons why institutional reform has not played a more prominent role.  First, the 
scope for vertical policy integration is limited by the multi-layered nature of energy policy, where 
relevant legal competences are shared between EU, national and devolved levels of government, 
and by the requirement under EU internal market legislation to have an independent regulatory 
authority.33  Second, there has been an influential argument against integration of economic with 
social and environmental regulation, on the basis that this would undermine economic efficiency, 
ĂŶĚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ŝŶ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making for which they could not be held properly 
accountable without threatening their independence.34  On this model, it is for ministers or other 
specialist agencies to set social and environmental objectives through specific regulatory rules. 
This argument is highly problematic, since it both over-estimates the neutrality of economic 
regulation and under-estimates the connections between economic, social and environmental 
objectives.35  Unless sustainability objectives are built into the design of market and network rules, 
the effectiveness of social and environmental regulation is likely to be seriously compromised.  
Equally, ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ƐĞĐƚŽƌĂů ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞmeans that it is well placed to contribute to the 
development of social and environmental measures.36  Nevertheless, there are still valid objections 
to institutional integration.  On the one hand, larger, more powerful regulatory organisations may 
reduce decision-making transparency and be harder to hold to account.  On the other hand, there 
are advantages in terms of regulatory stability and certainty in maintaining existing institutions. 
The approach adopted in Britain has therefore been something of a compromise.  While Ofgem has 
been given some new responsibilities for social and environmental programmes, these involve 
implementation rather than policy development, and are organised separately from its regulatory 
functions.  Instead, (as will be discussed below) policy integration has been sought primarily through 
ĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐKĨŐĞŵ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇĚƵƚŝĞƐ ƚŽ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ŝƚ ƚŽŐŝǀĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?
and by ministerial guidance to achieve greater alignment with broader energy policy goals. 
More significant institutional change has, however, taken place at ministerial level, with the 
establishment of a combined Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in October 2008.  
This was a very important development, which not only created a strong advocate for sustainable 
energy policies within government, but also had implications for Ofgem, since it ceased to be 
answerable to ministers in the pro-market business department.  Nevertheless, institutional 
integration can never be complete, and important policy levers remain with other departments.  In 
                                                          
31 There have, however, been some key personnel changes further down the organisation which are regarded 
as having been important in permitting a change in regulatory direction. 
32 Sustainable Energy Act 2003, s 6. 
33 Directive 2009/72/EC, Art 35. 
34 For the classic statement of this position see Foster CD, Privatisation, Public Ownership and the Regulation of 
Natural Monopoly (Oxford, Blackwell, 1992); and for a recent restatement see Yarrow, n 12. 
35 ^ĞĞĂƌƚůĞ/ĂŶĚsĂƐƐW ? ‘/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ PZĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨŝƚƐZŽůĞŝŶ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ
ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?hƚŝůŝƚŝĞƐWŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?^ĞĞ ĂůƐŽDŝƚĐŚĞůůĂŶĚtŽŽĚŵĂŶ ?Ŷ ? ? 
36 Bartle and Vass, n 14, p 2. 
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particular, the Treasury continues to exercise substantial influence in energy policy, both through 
controlling taxation, and in setting departmental budgets and agreeing aims and objectives.  Indeed, 
there have been significant recent disagreements between DECC and Treasury ministers, especially 
in relation to renewable energy subsidies and support for gas-fired generation.37 
Statutory Duties 
A key method used to promote sustainable electricity regulation in Britain has been amendment of 
KĨŐĞŵ ?Ɛ ŐĞneral statutory duties.  The current set of duties originated in the Utilities Act 2000, 
which sought to establish both a comprehensive set of duties and a hierarchy amongst them.  Thus 
the Act distinguishĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ  ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? to protect consumers (wherever 
appropriate by promoting competition), a range of secondary duties, to which it is obliged to have 
regard in the performance of its principal objective, and a set of tertiary objectives, to be promoted 
insofar as consistent with the principal objective and secondary duties.  Although the subsidiary 
duties included obligations to protect vulnerable consumers, secure a diverse and reliable supply of 
electricity, promote energy efficiency, and have regard to environmental impacts, as well as to take 
account of ministerial social and environmental guidance,38 attempts to insert a specific reference to 
sustainable development were rejected by the government.39 
Subsequently, however, the statutory duties have been repeatedly amended to increase the priority 
to be given to sustainability objectives.  The Energy Act 2004 first inserted a new tertiary duty 
requiring the regulator to ĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚŝƚƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶŶĞƌ ‘ďĞƐƚĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚƚŽĐontribute to the 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?40  In 2008, this was promoted to the status of a secondary 
duty, and the principal objective was amended to make clear that it included the interests of future 
as well as current consumers.41  In 2010, the principal objective was further amended to specify that 
ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŵĞĂŶ  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ (a) their interests in the 
reduction of electricity-supply emissions of targeted greenhouse gases and (b) their interests in the 
security of the supply of electricity to them. ?42  Finally in 2011, reflecting its status as a national 
regulatory authority under EU law, Ofgem was given an additional obligation to pursue the 
objectives of the third internal electricity market directive,43 which requires it to promote, inter alia, 
 ‘a competitive, secure and environmentally sustainable internal market ?.44 
Although statutory duties are sometimes purely symbolic, the close attention paid to the structure 
and ǁŽƌĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ KĨŐĞŵ ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĚƵƚŝĞs suggests that changes have been intended to make a 
difference to its regulatory decisions.45  However, administrative law scholarship46 suggests that 
there is no straightforward relationship between legal obligations and administrative decision-
                                                          
37 See in particular a leaked letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, to the Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed Davey  W Financial Times, 23 July 2012. 
38 Electricity Act 1989, ss 3A and 3B. 
39 Owen, n 30, p 19.   
40 Energy Act 2004, s 83. 
41 Energy Act 2008, s 83. 
42 Energy Act 2010, s 17. 
43 Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets) Regulations 2011, SI 2704/2011, reg.27(b). 
44 Directive 2009/72/EC, art. 36(a). 
45 See, eg, Sustainable Development Commission, n 14, p 26. 
46 See, eg, Halliday S and Hertogh M (eds), Judicial Review and Bureacratic Impact: International and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).   
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making, whereby statutory instructions are automatically translated into concrete outcomes.  Legal 
duties are not the only factors influencing decisions, and they may sometimes be only weakly 
determinative of administrative behaviour.  Nevertheless, organisations might respond to new 
statutory duties for several reasons: first, for normative reasons, because they coincide with their 
pre-existing institutional culture; second, for instrumental reasons, because they risk enforcement 
action if they do not comply; or third, for symbolic reasons, to acknowledge the political message 
that the legal change embodies.   
/ŶKĨŐĞŵ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?at least initially, there was clearly no prior normative commitment to sustainability 
objectives.  Instrumental reasons for responding to new statutory duties also seem to be weak.  
Although regulatory decisions are subject to judicial review, it is highly unlikely that a claim based on 
breach of the general duties would succeed.  While decisions are sometimes overturned on 
procedural grounds or in cases involving narrow points of interpretation, the extent of the 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽďĞƚĂŬĞŶŝŶƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ, and the nature of the 
decisions to be made mean that the courts are, generally speaking, reluctant to interfere with 
substantive regulatory choices.47  Moreover, the vagueness of sustainable development duties 
makes them particularly difficult to enforce.48 
In fact, there is no case to my knowledge in which the application or interpretatŝŽŶ ŽĨ KĨŐĞŵ ?Ɛ
general duties has ever been an issue.  Nevertheless, it is an organisation which displays an 
unusually high degree of legal consciousness, treating its principal objective in particular as a key 
reference point in justifying its decisions.  Unlike many other government agencies, it has 
particularly strong reasons to fear judicial review, since it deals with powerful, well-resourced 
companies for whom its decisions often have substantial financial consequences.  The threat of 
judicial review  W costly and disruptive in itself, even if ultimately unsuccessful  W therefore forms a 
constant background to its decisions, making it unusually cautious about legal risk.49 
But there are other reasons why Ofgem might be especially attentive to its statutory duties.  For 
instance, statutory duties may be more significant for regulatory commissions than for individual 
regulators, because they provide coherence which might otherwise be lacking.50  Given perennial 
criticisms about inadequate accountability, demonstrating compliance with statutory duties is also 
an important touchstone of legitimacy for an independent regulator.  Further, new statutory duties 
create an expectation of change, and provide a peg upon which to hang public criticism.51  In other 
words, there are strong reasons to expect sustainability duties to have an impact for symbolic 
reasons. 
                                                          
47 ^ĞĞ ?ĞŐ ?ZĂǁůŝŶŐƐ ?Z ? ‘ŚĂŶŐĞĚŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?KůĚdƌƵƚŚƐ P:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůZĞǀŝĞǁŝŶĂZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌǇ>ĂďŽƌĂƚŽƌǇ ? ?ŝŶKůŝǀĞƌ ?
D, Prosser, T and Rawlings, R (eds), The Regulatory State: Constitutional Implications (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010). 
48 ^ĞĞ:ĞŶŬŝŶƐs ? ‘WůĂĐŝŶŐ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞ,ĞĂƌƚŽĨ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞh< PƚŚĞZŽle of Law in 
the Evolution of Sustainable Development as the Central Organising Principle of Government (2002) 22 Leg 
^ƚƵĚƐ ? ? ? ?ZŽƐƐ ? ‘tŚǇ>ĞŐŝƐůĂƚĞĨŽƌ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ŶǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
Provisions in UK and Scottish StaƚƵƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:> ? ? ? 
49 Sustainable Development Commission, n 14, p 37; DECC, Ofgem Review: Final Report (2011), pp 48  W 49, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48134/2151-ofgem-review-
final-report.pdf viewed 4 April 2013. 
50 ^ĞĞKǁĞŶ ?' ? ‘^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƵƚŝĞƐ PEĞǁZŽůĞƐĨŽƌh<ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐZĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Utilities 
Policy 208, at 215. 
51 Owen , n 30, p 27; Ross, n 48, p 64. 
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Although caution needs to be exercised in attributing changes in regulatory practice to changes in 
statutory duties,52 there is indeed evidence of Ofgem attempting to respond to its increasing 
sustainability obligations.  For instance, the Energy Act 2004 prompted the establishment of a 
sustainable development committee at board level and the publication of an annual sustainable 
development report.  More substantial changes followed the 2008 Act, including an organisational 
restructuring to create a new sustainable development division, a major reform of network price 
regulation to deliver long-term sustainability objectives, and the launch of Project Discovery, which 
involved a fundamental reassessment of whether current market arrangements were capable of 
delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies.  Most recently, following the 2010 Act, Ofgem has 
reviewed its impact assessment procedures to ensure a more systematic and transparent approach 
to considering issues with long-term strategic or sustainability implications. 
While the initial response was limited and fairly superficial,53 this perhaps reflected the relatively 
weak political commitment which the 2004 Act duty embodied: it ǁĂƐůŽǁĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌ ?ƐůŝƐƚ
of priorities, it was enacted only as a result of parliamentary pressure,54 and it was not reinforced by 
revised social and environmental guidance.55  As sustainability obligations have strengthened, they 
appear to have produced a more significant organisational shift.  While Ofgem still stresses its 
limited control over the delivery of sustainability objectives, it now sees itself as having a 
 ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ facilitate change, by engaging in the debate, trying to persuade relevant players to 
make changes where required and contributing information and expertise where we can. ?56 
However, there are limits to what can be achieved through general statutory duties alone.  First, the 
broader the duties, the greater the flexibility to respond to changing understandings of what 
sustainability requires, but the less effective they are in securing policy integration across 
government.57  For example, DECC concluded in 2011 that there was still insufficient alignment 
between regulatory decisions and government strategy.58  As Owen puts it, if the government is 
seeking specific outcomes that regulatory actions can affect, it iƐƐƚŝůůƌĞůǇŝŶŐƚŽƐŽŵĞĚĞŐƌĞĞ  ‘ŽŶĂ
ƌĞŐŝŵĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚŽƌŝƐƐǇŵƉĂƚŚĞƚŝĐ ? ?59 
Secondly, it has been argued that, since sustainability provides a framework for decision-making 
rather than a set of concrete objectives, substantive obligations need to be supported by 
appropriate procedural requirements for consultation, reporting and scrutiny.60  Ofgem does report 
specifically on sustainability issues on a non-statutory basis, but it has no obligation to consult on 
what its duties require (and has not done so).61  While it does consult extensively before making 
formal regulatory decisions, consultation exercises tend, unsurprisingly, to be dominated by 
regulated companies.  Ofgem does make some effort to compensate, for example, through the 
                                                          
52 Eg, change may have happened anyway, given overlap with pre-existing duties; it may occur in anticipation 
of legal change; or the regulator may misinterpret what is required  W Bartle and Vass, n 14, p 10. 
53 Sustainable Development Commission, n 14; Bartle and Vass, n 14, pp 24-27. 
54 See Owen, n 50, p 213. 
55 Bartle and Vass, n 14, p 38. 
56 http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Sustainability/Pages/Sustain.aspx viewed 4 April 2013.  
57 ZŽƐƐ ? ‘/ƚ ?ƐdŝŵĞƚŽ'Ğƚ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐ W Why Legislation is Needed to Make Sustainable Development a Reality in 
ƚŚĞh< ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ? ? ?-1116. 
58 N 49, p 24. 
59 N 30, p 25. 
60 Ross, n57, p 1108. 
61 Bartle and Vass, n 14, p 1. 
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appointment of a non-statutory sustainable development advisory group, but there are no 
systematic statutory arrangements for representation of sustainability interests, as there are, for 
instance, for consumer interests.  In addition, scrutiny arrangements are weak.  Until 2011, the 
widely admired Sustainable Development Commission performed general advisory and scrutiny 
functions across government.  However, it fell victim to an austerity-driven  ‘ďŽŶĨŝƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƋƵĂŶŐŽƐ ? ?
Legally-Binding Targets 
Another notable way in which the law has been used to support the transition to sustainable energy 
markets in Britain is through the setting of legally-binding targets.  Targets impose duties on 
ministers rather than the regulator, and provide harder-edged commitments to achieve specific 
outcomes by a specified date. 
The first targets relevant to the energy sector to be adopted were for the eradication of fuel poverty, 
amongst all households in England and Scotland by 2016, and in Wales by 2017, and amongst 
vulnerable households by 2010.62  The Climate Change Act 2008 then imposed a set of overarching 
targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26 per cent compared with 1990 levels by 2020 and 
by 80 per cent by 2050, along with an obligation to set legally-ďŝŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ĐĂƌďŽŶďƵĚŐĞƚƐ ?ĂƚĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌůǇ
intervals.63  In 2009, the EU Renewables Directive64 required the UK to increase the share of final 
energy consumption from renewable sources in the electricity, heat and transport sectors by 15 per 
cent by 2020.  Although the directive does not specify targets for each sector, the government is 
obliged to set indicative sectoral targets, which for renewable electricity is around 30 per cent.65  In 
2012, the EU Energy Efficiency Directive66 set a binding target for a 17 per cent reduction in EU-wide 
energy consumption by 2020.  At present, Member States are only obliged to set indicative national 
targets,67 but they could face mandatory targets if, following a European Commission review in 
2014, their progress is judged to be inadequate.  Finally, the Energy Bill currently before Parliament 
contains a power to set a decarbonisation target for the electricity industry by 2030.68  As a 
compromise between DECC and the Treasury, which opposes the target,69 it is currently intended 
that the power will not be exercised (if at all) until 2016, once the carbon budget for 2028 to 2032 
has been set.  However, a cross-party amendment has been tabled which would convert the power 
into a duty to set a target by 2014. 
As the uncertainty over the decarbonisation target indicates, despite the proliferation of legally-
binding targets, their merits are disputed.  In their favour, they have three potential benefits.  First, 
                                                          
62 Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000; Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 88. 
63 The Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 imposes at 42% target for 2020 on the Scottish Ministers, along 
with an obligation to set annual targets. 
64 Directive 2009/28/EC. 
65 DECC, UK Renewable Energy Roadmap: Update 2012, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/80246/11-02-
13_UK_Renewable_Energy_Roadmap_Update_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf viewed 5 April 2013.  
66 Directive 2012/27/EU. 
67 The UK is aiming for a 9  W 11% cut in energy demand by 2020  W DECC, The Energy Efficiency Strategy: The 
Energy Efficiency Opportunity in the UK (2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65603/6928-the--energy-
efficiency-strategy-statistical-strat.pdf viewed 5 April 2013.  
68 More accurately, a target for the carbon intensity of electricity generation. 
69 See Osborne, n 37 above. 
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and most importantly, they can be an effective way of securing policy commitment.  Setting a 
legally-binding target has high symbolic value, raising the political profile of the issue in question and 
providing clarity about the future direction of policy as well as relative priorities between potentially 
conflicting objectives.  A clear target and timetable for action creates a greater sense of urgency to 
take practical action, and it also acts as an important reference point for all of those implicated in 
delivery of the goal.  In all cases, the energy-relevant targets appear to have had a galvanising effect 
on policy-makers, prompting serious reappraisal of relevant policies and leading to substantial new 
initiatives.70 
The second benefit is that a target sets a clear standard against which ministers can be made 
accountable for the success or failure of their policies.  Legal targets are more difficult to ignore than 
policy targets, and less vulnerable to definitional shifts, although much depends on how precisely 
the target is defined.  The fuel poverty targets are problematic in this respect, since not only is the 
statutory definition of fuel poverty vague,71 but the targets are only to be met  ‘ƐŽĨĂƌĂƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ
pƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞ ? ?  In fact, having missed the interim target and admitted that the 2016 target is 
unachievable, the government is proposing to change the way in which fuel poverty is measured in 
England.72  Nevertheless, the existence of the target remains useful in focusing attention on the 
problem, highlighting the gap between ambition and reality.  As with statutory duties, targets 
provide an anchor for public criticism.  The climate change targets are especially effective in this 
regard given the existence of the Committee on Climate Change, which is an independent statutory 
body responsible for advising on and scrutinising climate change policies.  For example, in 
September 2012, the Committee published an open letter criticising government statements on the 
desirability of expanding gas-fired generation73 as being incompatible with long-term carbon targets, 
and supporting calls for the adoption of a decarbonisation target.74  This undoubtedly strengthened 
 ?Ɛ ŚĂŶĚ in its dispute with the Treasury, and scuppered the ůĂƚƚĞƌ ?Ɛ attempt to abandon the 
decarbonisation target altogether. 
The final benefit of targets is that they increase policy stability and hence investor certainty.  The 
more focused the target, the greater the certainty it provides, and this is the key argument for 
adding the decarbonisation target on top of the more general renewables and climate change 
                                                          
70 See: UK Fuel Poverty Strategy (2001), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file16495.pdf viewed 5 April 2013; 
The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan: National Strategy for Climate and Energy (2009), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100509134746/http:/www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/publica
tions/lc_trans_plan/lc_trans_plan.aspx, visited 5 April 2013; The UK Renewable Energy Strategy, Cm 7686 
(2009), http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm76/7686/7686.pdf viewed 5 April 2013; Energy 
Efficiency Strategy, n 67.  
71 A person is ŝŶĨƵĞůƉŽǀĞƌƚǇŝĨƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ‘ĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨĂŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚǁŝƚŚĂůŽǁŝŶĐŽŵĞůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶĂŚŽŵĞǁŚŝĐŚ
cannoƚďĞŬĞƉƚǁĂƌŵĂƚĂƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĐŽƐƚ ? ? 
72 DECC, Fuel Poverty: Changing the Framework for Measurement (2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66570/6406-fuel-poverty-
changing-the-framework-for-measureme.pdf viewed 5 April 2013.  
73 DECC, Annual Energy Statement 2012 (2012), para 2.36, 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/65633/7086-annual-energy-
statement-2012.pdf viewed 5 April 2013.  
74 Letter to Edward Davey MP, 13 September 2012, http://hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/EMR%20letter%20-
%20September%2012.pdf viewed 5 April 2013.  See further Letter to Edward Davey MP, 25 February 2013, 
urging the government to amend the Energy Bill to require the target to be set by 2014, 
http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Ed-Davey-February13.pdf viewed 28 April 2013. 
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targets.  By committing to outcomes rather than specific policy mechanisms, targets also strike a 
balance between certainty and flexibility, ie, by providing reassurance that the goal will remain 
unchanged even if the means to achieve it are altered.  Nevertheless, there remains a tension 
between certainty and flexibility.  For instance, the renewable energy directive contains mechanisms 
which allow member states to enter into arrangements to count renewable energy production in 
other member states towards their national targets.  While this provides flexibility to meet the 
collective targets in the most cost-effective manner, it undermines certainty for investors in any 
particular country. 
The reason these provisions were included was to address one of major criticisms of targets which is 
that they are inflexible and hence inefficient because they do not let the market decide, for instance, 
what the appropriate generation mix should be or how best to respond to the costs of climate 
change.  These are the central arguments used by the Treasury against adopting the decarbonisation 
target75 and extending the EU renewables target beyond 2020.76  To some extent, these kinds of 
criticisms are based on an unduly optimistic view of the ability of markets to deliver sustainability 
objectives (if not outright hostility to such objectives) and hence underestimate the scale of the 
barriers that need to be overcome.  Nevertheless, there is clearly some truth in the related 
argument that targets can be arbitrary.  While the climate change and decarbonisation targets are 
underpinned by scientific advice, the EU targets in particular are more reflective of what is politically 
acceptable rather than objectively defensible, although making targets legally binding arguably 
brings greater realism and therefore credibility to the target-setting process.  Targets are also 
potentially distorting in focusing attention on issues which are subject to targets at the expense of 
those which are not, which seems inconsistent with the integrated and holistic approach that 
sustainability demands.  One answer might be to adopt more targets, but having too many may 
undermine their symbolic value, and hence their motivating force. 
A final criticism of legally-binding targets is that they are in practice impossible to guarantee, since 
their achievement depends on a range of factors some of which are beyond government control.  
This is clearly evident in relation to the fuel poverty targets, where the gains from measures to 
combat fuel poverty, largely focused on improving the thermal efficiency of dwellings, have been 
wholly outweighed by energy price rises, which are partly attributable to rising world gas prices, and 
to unavoidable investment in replacement generation and network assets, and only partly to the 
specific effects of government policies. 
This raises the question whether targets can in any meaningful sense be legally binding.  None of the 
targets specifies any enforcement procedures or sanctions for breach, and there is considerable 
scepticism about the possibility of judicial enforcement.77  In fact, in R (Friends of the Earth) v 
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2009] EWCA Civ 810, the Court of Appeal refused 
to grant a declaration that the government was in breach of statutory duty when it admitted that 
                                                          
75 Osborne, n 37. 
76 UK Comments on 2050 Energy Roadmap to European Commission, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/89227104/UK-Comments-on-2050-Energy-Roadmap-to-EU-Commission-5 viewed 
5 April 2013.  
77 ^ĞĞDĐ,ĂƌŐ ? ‘ůŝŵĂƚĞŚĂŶŐĞŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?>ĞƐƐŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ<ŝŶŐĚŽŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Climate Law 
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the interim fuel poverty target would be missed.  The decision was based primarily on the absence, 
as a matter of statutory construction, of any absolute duty to meet the target.  However, the court 
was also reluctant to second-ŐƵĞƐƐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶǁŚĂƚǁĂƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂďůĞ ?ĂŶd 
in particular was unwilling to interfere with departmental budget allocations.  The other targets are 
perhaps distinguishable because they are stated in unqualified terms, and arguably should be 
treated by the courts as setting overriding government priorities.78  Nevertheless, the prospects for 
direct judicial enforcement are probably slim, albeit they might still have some legal relevance as the 
basis for relevant considerations or irrationality challenges where government decisions are wholly 
incompatible with meeting targets, or for procedural challenges in cases of failure to comply with 
supporting reporting obligations.  
However, the focus on the legal enforceability of targets perhaps misses the point.  Their purpose is 
to secure progress towards a policy goal, rather than to ensure strict compliance,79 and as with 
general statutory duties, the symbolic value of setting  W or refusing to set  W a legally-binding target 
may be more important than the prospect of judicial enforcement.  Clearly governments do regard 
the creation of legal targets as being significant, otherwise they would not object to them or haggle 
over their terms.  In addition, again as for general duties, the supporting procedural obligations to 
consult on and publish strategies for delivering the targets and for reporting on and scrutiny of 
progress are at least as important as the substantive obligations to comply with targets.  As I have 
argued in relation to the climate change targets,80 it is the very elaborate supporting process of 
setting carbon budgets, publishing plans for meeting the budgets, reporting annually on progress, 
scrutiny by the Committee on Climate Change, and duties to respond to its recommendation which 
are the really important and innovative aspect of the Climate Change Act, because they maintain 
political attention on emissions reduction and help to embed it in government decision-making. 
Guidance, Strategies and Plans 
In fact, procedural obligations to produce policy statements, strategies, action plans and so on are 
frequently used as a commitment-forcing mechanism independently of associated targets.  These 
require ministers or the regulator to be more specific, not just about their policy goals, but about the 
particular means by which those goals with be secured, thus providing additional clarity and 
certainty.  Typically, the actual content of the strategies etc has no legal status, but there are two 
exceptions. 
The first is the system of ministerial social and environmental guidance put in place by the Utilities 
Act 2000, to which Ofgem is obliged to have regard in its decision-making.  The first set of guidance 
was published in 2002 and revised in 2004 and 2010.  The guidance was intended to address 
concerns about the legitimacy of Ofgem taking account of social and environmental matters, and to 
ensure alignment between government policy and regulatory decision-making.  However, the 
government has recently concluded that it has been of limited effectiveness, due to: its weak legal 
ƐƚĂƚƵƐŝŶĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƚŽKĨŐĞŵ ?ƐŽƚŚĞƌĚƵƚŝĞƐ ?ǁĞĂŬĂƌƌĂŶŐements for accountability; the fact that it 
has not always been kept up to date; and its limited scope (eg it does not cover security of supply 
                                                          
78 See McHarg, ibid; Reid, ibid. 
79 House of Commons Public Administration Committee, On Target? Government by Measurement, 5th Report, 
2002/03, HC 62, paras 76, 118, 124. 
80 See n 77. 
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issues);81 to which can be added the relatively vague content of the guidance, at least in its earlier 
versions.  Arguably, the major impact of the guidance has actually been to reduce the pressure on 
Ofgem to pursue non-economic goals, because it states that decisions with major financial 
implications are to be made by ministers rather than the regulator.  The guidance will therefore be 
abolished by the Energy Bill and replaced by a new Strategy and Policy Statement (SPS) which will set 
clear outcomes to which Ofgem will be expected to contribute.  The regulator will have to specify 
how it intends to achieve the outcomes, report annually on progress, and inform ministers if an 
outcome is unachievable.  There are also stronger provisions for consultation and parliamentary 
approval of the SPS, and restrictions on the circumstances in which it can be revised.  The stated 
aims are to provide greater clarity over government policy, greater alignment between government 
and regulator, and greater predictability for investors, with less need for ad hoc government 
intervention.82 
The second exception is the system of National Policy Statements (NPS) adopted for England and 
Wales under the Planning Act 2008.83  Six, very detailed NPS on energy infrastructure were approved 
by Parliament in July 2011,84 following public consultation and strategic environmental assessment, 
which set out the need for investment in particular types of energy infrastructure, and specify the 
considerations to be taken into account in development applications.  Objectors may not question 
the merits of policies set out in the NPS, and there is a statutory presumption that decisions will be 
made in accordance with them.85  The system thus aims to reduce planning delays for nationally 
important infrastructural developments, and to provide developers with greater certainty as to the 
criteria that will be applied. 
Both sets of statements are a welcome acknowledgment of the need for a high degree of clarity over 
government policy to aid the transition to sustainable electricity markets.  However, they are limits 
to how much certainty they can deliver.  Each performs a restricted function within the overall 
regulatory system.  They are also limited in their specificity.  For instance, the NPS deliberately 
refrain from setting out intended market shares for different generation technologies or dictating 
where grid reinforcements should take place, and it seems unlikely that the SPS, which will not be 
published until 2014, will be any more precise.  In addition both statements are liable to change.  It is 
explicitly envisaged, for example, that the SPS may be reviewed following a change in government.  
Finally, clarity and certainty may come at the expense of legitimacy, to the extent that the 
statements foreclose meaningful participation in specific regulatory or planning decisions.86 
Legal Protection against Regulatory Change 
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A final way in which the law can assist with the transition to sustainable electricity markets is in 
providing protection for investors in sustainable technologies against regulatory change.87  In 
general, there is a strong recognition in the United Kingdom of the need to protect vested interests 
when regulations are changed, and protections are often built into regulatory instruments via 
transitional arrangements or other techniques.  For instance, the new contracts for difference to be 
introduced by the Energy Bill to support low carbon generation will use private law contracts rather 
than purely administrative arrangements in order to provide greater investor certainty.  Sometimes, 
however, additional protection is required. 
This issue arose in Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change v Friends of the Earth [2012] 
EWCA Civ 28 in relation to a change in the feed-in tariff (FIT) for small-scale solar PV.  The 
microgeneration FIT scheme was introduced in April 2010, but during 2011 it became apparent that 
the take-up of the solar FIT was much greater than expected, because installation costs had fallen 
substantially, making the FIT very generous.  This threatened to exceed the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘Levy Control 
FƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ? ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ŽŶ by the Treasury, which limits the amount of subsidy available for 
sustainable energy programmes.  On 31 October 2011, DECC therefore launched a consultation 
which proposed, uncontroversially, to reduce the tariff as from 1 April 2012 (the tariff rate being 
determined by the year, from April, in which an installation becomes eligible).  However, it also 
proposed to backdate the change to installations made after 12 December 2011  W ie, after the 
consultation had been launched but before the amending regulations were made.  The reason was 
to prevent a late surge in installations to take advantage of the higher rate, and the government 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ Ɛŝǆ ǁĞĞŬƐ ? ŶŽƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŐŝǀĞŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƉĂƉĞƌ ǁĂƐ Ă ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ
transition period.  Friends of the Earth and others successfully challenged this as amounting to an 
unlawful retrospective interference with vested rights.  The Court of Appeal held that it was inherent 
in the notion of a FIT that it guaranteed a rate of return on investment and that, in the absence of 
explicit statutory authority, the tariff rate could not be changed retrospectively. 
This case is interesting because it illustrates the competing demands of regulatory certainty and 
flexibility.  The essential reason for the change was to protect consumers against excessive price 
rises.  There was also arguably no real unfairness to people planning to install solar PV because the 
FIT was higher than necessary to recoup their investment.  However, the cost of the change in terms 
of the credibility of the FIT scheme was very high indeed.  Given that regulatory risk increases the 
ĐŽƐƚŽĨ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĂŶĚŵĂǇ ĚĞƚĞƌ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ĂůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ŝƚǁĂƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐ ?
long-term interest. 
Judicial intervention to prevent regulatory change is, however, likely to be rare.  Friends of the Earth 
can be contrasted with Tate and Lyle Sugars Ltd v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 
[2011] EWCA Civ 664, which concerned a change in support rates under the Renewables Obligation 
(RO).  This is a green certificate scheme applicable to large-scale renewable generation, which 
provides varying support for different technology bands.  Tate and Lyle disputed the way in which 
one of the technology bands had been calculated, arguing that they should have received a higher 
support rate.  The government accepted that there had been an error, but decided to launch an 
early review of this technology band, taking into account up-to-date cost and revenue data, which 
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concluded that a lower support rate was now appropriate.  Tate and Lyle applied unsuccessfully for 
judicial review.  The Court of Appeal held that the review power was not limited to correcting the 
initial error, it was not part of the RO scheme that returns were guaranteed, and it was not unfair to 
deprive the company of a windfall. 
Conclusion 
As this survey of recent British experience of regulating for sustainable electricity markets indicates, 
the law can help to reorient regulatory regimes towards sustainable outcomes in a variety of 
different ways.  While lawyers may typically think in terms of judicial intervention, British experience 
suggests that the role of the courts is relatively minor.  Far more significant are the symbolic, 
institutional and procedural functions of law  W bringing clarity, visibility and authority to political 
commitments, and embedding them within decision-making processes.  Law is clearly not a 
substitute for political commitment, but legal and political commitments are mutually reinforcing: 
the stronger the legal framework, the harder it is to dismantle.   
The British experience also suggests that the more specific the legal commitment, the more effective 
is it in promoting change.  The British system is clearly moving towards recognition of the need for a 
much more interventionist role for government, directing rather than merely nudging the regulator 
and market actors towards particular outcomes.  However, there is still a residual reluctance to plan 
the transition to a sustainable electricity system; to commit to a clear development path, and not 
merely a set of desirable objectives or outcomes.  There are understandable reasons for wanting to 
maintain flexibility in terms of efficiency, democracy and sustainability itself.  Yet given the scale and 
urgency of the task, planning may ultimately be unavoidable.  The question then will be to consider 
the role of law in supporting an effective and legitimate electricity planning process. 
